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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
CaseNo.20020109-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee

vs.
MICHAEL NORTON,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a judgment and conviction for two counts of acting as a Bail Bond
Recovery Agent, without a proper license, under Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-107 (1998) and § 53-11124 (1998), class A misdemeanors, two counts of Unlawful Detention, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5304 (Supp. 2001), class B misdemeanors, and Assault, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp.
2000), a class B misdemeanor, in the First Judicial District Court, Cache County, the Honorable Clint
S. Judkins presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court create an unconstitutional "strict liability" offense negating the State's
burden of proving the mens rea element of the offense of Acting as a Bail Bond Recovery Agent or
Apprentice without a license, under Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-107 (1998)?
Standard of Review: The Standard of review of this issue is difficult because the issue of
whether this was a "strict liability" offense is being raised for the first time on appeal. "With limited
1

exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first
time on appeal." Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. Of Edu.. 797 P.2d 412,413 (Utah 1990); State v.
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). Defendant claims that this issue was preserved by the
argument at Defendant's Motion in Limine, on March 30,2001. If defendant is appealing from that
ruling, then the issue is whether the trial properly ruled that defendant was not entitled to assert a
mistake of law defense.
2. Did the trial court properly rule that defendant was not entitled to raise a mistake of law as
a defense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-3 04(2)(b) (1974), based on the facts of this case?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness with a "measure of
discretion" given to the trial court's application of the legal standard to the fact. State v. Pena. 869
P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114,1116 (Utah App. 1997).
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not allowing defendant to retake the witness stand
to testify about issues that the trial court had ruled were inadmissible, when defendant had already
given testimony concerning those matters.
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of admissibility or relevancy of testimony
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. ex rel. A.D.. 6 p.3d 1137,1138 (Utah App.
2000).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are contained in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
2

Defendant was charged with two counts of Acting as a Bail Enforcement Agent or Bail
Recovery Agent without a proper license, class A misdemeanors, one from April 4,2000, and the
other from April 16,2000. He was also charged with two counts of Unlawful Detention, class B
misdemeanors, one for each day, and one count of Assault, class B misdemeanor for his conduct on
April 16, 2000. (R. 1-3). On November 14th and November 15th, 2001, a jury trial was held on these
charges. On November 15th, 2001, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged on all counts
against defendant and his co-defendant (R. 252-253).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. The defendant in this case acted as a bail bondsman for the victim in this case, Deloy
Lindley (victim). Defendant posted a $50,000 bond for the victim on the victim's promise to pay
$5,000. The bond was subsequently reduced by a Judge to $10,000. The bond agreement listed
collateral, and civil remedies available to Appellant if the $5,000 was not paid, including seizure of
the collateral.. Around the first part of April 2000, when the victim could not pay the $5,000, it was
discussed among the parties that a truck that was listed as collateral would be sold.
2. Defendant had a conversation with a police officer about revoking the victim's bond. He
was told that the County Attorney's Office would not file criminal charges, but that he could pursue
the civil remedies that he had under his contract.
3. On April 4,2000, defendant went to victim's home and told him that he was going to
revoke his bond and take the victim to jail unless he had his wife sign over the title to the truck that
was listed as collateral in the contract. The truck title was signed over but the victim was arrested
anyway and taken by defendant and booked into the Cache County Jail. Defendant was not licensed
as a Bail Recovery Agent or Bail Enforcement Agent under Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-107 (1998), and
had not filed the proper paperwork to get the Judge to authorize that the bond be revoked.
3

4. On April 6,2000, victim appeared in front of Judge Thomas L. Wilmore and explained to
the Judge that his bail bondsman had arrested him and taken him back to jail. The prosecutor
indicated to the court that it appeared to be a contract dispute between Defendant and the victim.
Judge Wilmore indicated that "it doesn't seem like he should be held in jail." (See Addendum A,
page 4, lines 8-12) Judge Wilmore further stated "[t]he bail bondsman doesn't have any right to haul
you off to jail. I'm going to release you." (Id. at page 5, lines 10-12).
5. Victim was released from jail by the Court. On April 16,2000, without checking with the
Court to see why the victim had been released, Defendant, along with co-defendant Lloyd, went back
to the home of the victim to re-arrest him. Defendant was still not properly licensed to revoke
victim's bail and had still not requested the Court to revoke the victim's bond. When the victim said
that Judge Wilmore had released him and that defendant had no authority to take him to jail and
refused to be arrested by defendant, defendant sprayed him in the face with pepper spray, chased him
down and tackled him to the ground. Victim testified in trial that he had been punched, kicked, and
hit with a rock. He also testified that co-defendant Lloyd had pulled a firearm on him and threatened
him with it. The victim testified that once they had him in the car, defendant told him he was going to
take the victim up the canyon and kill him. (Transcript November 14th, pages 77-84 & 108-112).
6. The victim's family called the police as their father was arrested and reported that one of
the people taking their father had a gun. Cache County Sheriffs Deputies and a Highway Patrol
Trooper stopped the vehicle in which victim was detained. They observed that victim had been
sprayed with pepper spray, that no one had attempted to treat him for that exposure, they found the
firearm they had been told about, and the victim complained to them about injuries he received from
the defendants.
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7. The case was investigated and when it was determined that defendant was not properly
licensed as a bail recovery agent, or bail enforcement agent, charges where filed. Defendant was
charged with two counts of Acting as a Bail Enforcement Agent or Bail Recovery Agent without a
proper license, class A misdemeanors, one from April 4, 2000, and the other from April 16,2000. He
was also charged with two counts of Unlawful Detention, class B misdemeanors, one for each day,
and one count of Assault, class B misdemeanor for his conduct on April 16, 2000.
8. In 1998, the Legislature enacted the Bail Bond Recovery Act. This act has existed in the
same format since that time and strictly prohibits the conduct that defendant was charged with. The
act was originally numbered Title 53, Chapter 10. However, when compiling the new code sections
the office of Legislative Research and General Counsel discovered that there were two Chapter 10s in
Title 53. The other chapter was named the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Act.
Because there were two chapter 10s, the office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
renumbered the Bail Bond Recovery Act as Chapter 11.

(See Addendum B, also attached to State's

response to Motion to Dismiss, R. 151-157).
9. The office of Legislative Research and General Counsel gave notice of this change in the
Compiler's notes at the end of U.C.A. § 77-20-8.5 in 1998, where it clearly states that Bail Bond
Recovery, cited in Subsection (3), was renumbered as Chapter 11 by the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel because of the enactment at the same session of another Chapter 10.
(See Addendum B, also attached to State's Response to Motion to Dismiss, R. 151-157). (Emphasis
added).
10. The Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel also gave notice of this change
at the beginning of Title 53, Chapter 10. The Compiler's notes for that section says "Laws 1998, chs.
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257, 282 and 343 also enacted a Chapter 10 of this title; those chapters have been renumbered as
Chapters 11, 13 and 12, respectively." (See Addendum B, also attached to State's Response to
Motion to Dismiss, R. 151 -157).
11. Chapter 11 of Title 53 also gives notice. It is titled Bail Bond Recovery Act. It also
gives notice in the compiler notes that this section was renumbered because there was originally two
chapter 10s that were enacted. (See Addendum B, also attached to State's Response to Motion to
Dismiss, R. 151-157).
12. Before trial, defendant filed a Motion in Limine, asking the trial court to rule on whether
he could claim a mistake of law defense in this case. Defendant asserted that he was told by a Deputy
Cache County Attorney that he could just revoke the victim's bond, without an order from the Court
or a proper license. On March 30,2001, an evidentiaiy hearing was held and Judge Judldns ruled that
even if he looked at the facts in the light most favorable to defendant, defendant had not made out a
mistake of law defense. (Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, March 30,2001, and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, R. 122-124).
13. A couple of weeks before the trial in this case, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss
claiming that because of an alleged typographical error in the code section, he did not heive proper
notice that his conduct violated the law.1 (R. 125-142). The State responded and set forth the
information outlined in paragraphs 8-11 above. In addition, the State presented evidence from the
Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Criminal Identification, showing that they had written letters
giving notice of the law requiring a person to be licensed to apprehend a person or surrender them to

1

This claim was not asserted by defendant until a couple of weeks before the trial, approximately a year
and a half after this crime occurred. In none of his prior pleadings or letters to the county attorney did defendant
ever mention the typographical error.
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jail. The letter written on November 2, 1999, clearly states that "[a]ny person apprehending and/or
surrendering a defendant that is not licensed according to (53-11-101) is in violation of the law.
UC.A. 53-11-124 (1998) establishes a violation of this law as a class A misdemeanor". (See Trial
Exhibits 3,4, R. 316). The trial court denied the defendant's motion for the reasons stated previously.
(Transcript November 14, Page 272, at lines 10-20).
14. The jury returned a finding of guilty as charged on all counts on November 25,2001. (R.
252-253).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant received a fair trial. The jury was instructed that they needed to find that defendant
committed the offenses knowingly or voluntarily. The jury was never instructed that this was a strict
liability offense. The trial court properly ruled that defendant could not establish a mistake of law
defense. Defendant had sufficient notice of the law's existence. The State did not have to prove that
defendant knew of the existence of the law or that his conduct would violate the law. Defendant's
rights were not violated when the trial court refused to allow him to retake the stand to testify about
matters that the trial court had ruled were inadmissible. The information that defendant sought to
testify about was information that he had already testified to, that his co-defendant had testified to,
and that his attorney mentioned in opening statement and closing argument. There is no likelihood
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had defendant been allowed to testify as he
wanted to.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT NEVER RULED AND THE JURY WAS NEVER
INSTRUCTED THAT U.C.A. § 53-11-107 WAS A STRICT LIABILITY CRIME.

7

Defendant asserts that as applied to him by the trial judge, the Bail Bond Recovery Act, under
Utah Code Ann. § 53-11-101; 53-11-107, was turned into a strict liability crime. That is simply not
true. The jury was instructed in each of the elements instructions, that one of the elements that the
jury needed to find was that defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. (Jury Instructions 2-9, R.
213-219). In addition, the jury was instructed as to the definition of knowing and intentional. (Jury
Instructions 10 & 11, R. 221, 222). The State argued that it was defendant's conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result of his conduct. The State argued that it was
defendant's conscious desire or objective to arrest and detain the victim and take him to jail. The
State argued that ignorance of law was not a defense even though there was evidence that defendant
knew or should have known that this conduct would be illegal. The State also argued that it was
defendant's desire to spray victim with pepper spray, tackle him to the ground, kick him, and threaten
his life. The jury found that to indeed have been defendant's desire or objective. At no time did the
trial court instruct or rule that the State did not have to prove the appropriate mens rea.
Defendant claims that this issue was preserved by the argument at Defendant's Motion in
Limine, on March 30,2001. He however, at no time argued that he thought that by the trial court's
actions, the court was creating a strict liability offense. This court should refuse to address that issue
because it is being raised for thefirsttime on appeal. See Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. Of Edu., 797
P.2d 412,413 (Utah 1990); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). Had defendant brought
the issue up before the trial court, they may have been granted an instruction or remedy that would
have clarified the issue to the jury to their satisfaction. Without doing anything however, if there was
an error made by the trial court, defendant lead the court into that error by not raising his objection.

8

Defendant should not be able to benefit from any alleged error on appeal. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201,1220 (Utah 1993).
A.

Defendant claimed that he was not acting as a bail bond recovery agent, but was
making a citizens arrest.

Defendant wants to claim that this jury had no choice but to convict him because of the way
the trial court ruled on his motion. That is simply not the case. In defendant's opening statement, he
claimed that the testimony of the State's witnesses could not be believed because it had changed so
many times. Defense counsel also stated that they would show that defendant acted within the law.
(Transcript November 14th, pages 59-60).
Defendant also testified that he believed that he was acting legally because he was making a
citizen's arrest and not acting as a Bail Recovery Agent. (Transcript November 15, page 70, 80-81).
The jury, after hearing all of the testimony, and viewing Mr. Norton's demeanor and lack of candor,
simply chose not to believe Mr. Norton's claim that he was making a citizen's arrest
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO RAISE A MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE.

In the event that this Court believes that defendant has sufficiently raised the issue at the trial
court, the State will address the issue of the Mistake of Law Defense. In December of 2000,
defendant's attorney filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to rule on whether he was entitled
to raise a mistake of law defense. (R. 46-85). That memorandum was responded to by the Cache
County Attorney's Office. The Weber County Attorney's Office, at the request of the Cache County
Attorney's Office, took over the prosecution of this case to avoid the appearance of a conflict. An
evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of the mistake of law defense on March 30,2001. At that
hearing, the trial court heard testimony and argument concerning the claim. Defendant was claiming
9

that Tony Baird from the Cache County Attorney's Office told him that he could go arrest the victim
and take him back to jail if the victim had violated his contract with defendant.
Tony Baird, Deputy Cache County Attorney testified that he had a conversation with a police
officer, where the officer asked him if he would be willing to file criminal charges of theft against the
victim, where the victim had allegedly misrepresented collateral on his contract with Mr. Norton. Mr.
Baird told the officer that he would not file criminal charges and to tell defendant that he had a civil
remedy under his contract. (See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing. March 30, 2001, pages 14-15).
Mr. Baird then testified that at some point he had a conversation with defendant. He could not put a
date on the conversation and could not say whether it happened before or after victim was arrested
and these crimes were committed. Id. at 15-16. Mr. Baird remembered that defendant was
complaining about Don Linton (another prosecutor in the Cache County Attorney's Office), and that
Don had it out for him (defendant). Mr. Baird testified that the only thing he remembers talking to
defendant about, was about Mr. Linton.2 Mr. Baird testified that he does not recall ever having a
conversation with defendant about his authority to arrest the victim. Id. at page 16, line 13. Mr.
Baird testified that he never rendered an official opinion in writing or otherwise. Mr. Baird denied
that he ever told defendant he could go arrest the victim. Id- at page 17, line 18.
The trial court then viewed all of the evidence and proffered evidence in the light most
favorable to defendant's claims. (Transcript of Hearing, March 30,2001, Page 23, line 21, through
Page 24, line 1). The trial court then viewed the testimony in regard to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304
(1974). (See Addendum C). Even with giving defendant every benefit of the doubt, the trial court

2

Mr. Linton did not have any involvement in this case until he appeared in front of Judge Wilmore on
April 6, 2000. (See Addendum A.) At the time that defendant picked victim up the second time, he was not aware
of why the victim had been released. (See Transcript November 15th, 2001, page 70.) It was not until after that time
that defendant would have reason to believe that Mr. Linton "had it out for him."
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ruled that defendant had not met the required elements for a mistake of law defense. The court found
that Mr. Baird was not acting in a position of responsibility for interpreting the law, that any
conversation was an informal conversation and was not an official statement, and that there was no
written order or grant of permission. (Transcript March 20,2001, page 24). The trial court entered
appropriate findings of fact, and conclusions of law. (R. 122-124).
Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence to show that Judge Judkins ruling was in error.
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Tanner v. Carter, 20 P.3d 332, 336 (Utah 2001), the Court held
that when an appellant challenges a trial court's findings, that appellant must "marshal all the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." "Where the
appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, we need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the
findings." Id. Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in this case to show that Judge Judkins
findings were not supported by the evidence. Judge Judkins heard the hearing and gave defendant
every benefit of the doubt. Defendant has failed to produce any fact or other evidence that would
make Judge Judkin's ruling improper.
A. Defendant's alleged ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense in this case.
Defendant, then as well as now, wants to claim that he should not be guilty of these offenses
because he was (allegedly) not aware of the existence of the law requiring him to be licensed to arrest
someone and take them to jail. He claims that this (alleged) ignorance of the law should be a defense
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 (1974). The trial court heard the hearing and listened to the
witness who testified. Based on his observations of the facts, Judge Judkins ruled that defendant was
not entitled to claim that defense. Judge Judkins, should be allowed a "measure of discretion" on how
11

he applied the facts that he heard in the evidentiary hearing, to the law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
935-40 (Utah 1994).
This jury was instructed that they had to find that defendant acted knowingly and voluntarily
in committing each of his crimes. Defendant wanted the jury to have to find the additional element
that he knew what he was doing was a crime. That is not an element that the State is required to
prove to convict someone of a crime. In a Utah Supreme Court case almost a centuiy ago Skeen v.
Craig, 86 P. 487, 491 (Utah 1906), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 'there is no principle of law
more closely adhered to and followed than the rule that every person is presumed to know the law;
and when a party is accused of a crime he cannot be heard to say and to successfully plead as a
defense that he was ignorant of the law which he is charged with having violated. In no case can one
enter a court...with the sole and naked defense that when he did the thing explained of he did not
know of the existence of the law which he violated." Id.
Even though defendant claims to have not known of the existence of this law, there was
ample evidence for the jury to believe that defendant did know that his conduct was prohibited.
Defendant's own contract contained no provision that would allow him to revoke the bond for nonpayment. The only time that the contract allowed defendant to seek to revoke the bond was if the
victim had not given him notice of court dates or for a failure to appear in court. (See Transcript
November 15th, 2001, Pages 105-108). Defendant had conversations with a Cache County Sheriffs
Deputy where he was told this was a civil matter. (Transcript November 15th, 2001, page 79, line 20,
through page 80, line 1). Although Deputy Larson did not testify at trial, if his testimony would have
become relevant at trial, he would have testified that he himself told defendant that he needed to seek
an arrest warrant before trying to pick up defendant. Other Deputies who testified at trial, testified
12

that Mr. Norton knew he could not make the arrest without having a deputy present. (Transcript
November 14th, 2001, page 221, lines 23-25).
Sargent James Allred of the Department of Public safety testified about his duties with the
Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) in the years of 1999 and 2000. Sargent Allred testified about
the Bail Bond Recovery Act being passed by the legislature in 1998,3 and the reasons that such an act
was required. He further testified about BCI's efforts to notify people of the change in the law.
Sargent Allred personally sent letters explaining that if someone was not licensed as a bail bond
recovery agent, and they arrested someone to revoke a bond, they were committing a class A
misdemeanor. Sargent Allred testified that these letters, along with a list of current license holders
were mailed out approximately every quarter. (Transcript November 14th, page 205, line 11). These
letters were mailed out to courts, jails, sheriffs offices and later to bond companies. (Transcript
November 14th, page 204, line 12).
After the victim was illegally arrested the first time, he appeared before Judge Wilmore on
April 6th, 2001. At that time the prosecutor expressed to the judge that he did not know how a bail
bondsman acquires the kind of authority to just arrest the victim and bring him back to jail, and that it
seemed like a contract issue between the victim and the bondsman (See Addendum A, also included
as State's Trial Exhibit # 1, pages 3& 4). Judge Wilmore then told the victim that "[t]he bail
bondsman doesn't have any right to haul you off to jail. I'm going to release you." (Addendum A,
page 5, line 10). Defendant then found out that Judge Wilmore has released the victim, and without
checking into the reason, went right out and arrested victim again on April 16th, 2000. If defendant

3

It is interesting to note that the same year that this licensing requirement was passed, defendant testified
that his licensing requirement as a bail bondsman also changed, and he was aware of that change. (See Transcript
November 15th, page 20, line 17).
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did as he claims to have done, and looked for the law in the code book, or online, he would have
received notice that his conduct would have been illegal. (See paragraphs 8-11, in Statement of
Relevant Facts).
ffl,

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION IN NOT
ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO RETAKE THE WITNESS STAND.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when not allowing defendant to retake the witness
stand to testify about issues that the trial court had ruled were inadmissible, and where defendant had
already given testimony concerning those matters. A trial court's determination of admissibility or
relevancy of testimony is review under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. ex rel. A.D.. 6 p.3d
1137, 1138 (Utah App. 2000). Also, as quoted by defendant in his docketing statement, "[t]he trial
court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of [evidence], and such decisions are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, we will not reverse unless the
decision exceeds the limits of responsibility." Quoting State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah
1993).
Defendant wanted to retake the stand and testify again of his efforts to know what the law was
and assert to the jury that he did not know he was violating the law. The Court's refusal to allow
defendant to re-take the stand to testify again of his alleged efforts to find out about the law was
proper. The Court had previously ruled that such evidence did not provide defendant with a defense,
the defendant had already testified of those facts, and any further testimony on the matter would have
been cumulative, potentially confusing, and a waist of time under the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule
403.
Defendant claims that he was denied by the Court, the ability to testify concerning the efforts
that he made to determine the law before he acted. That is false. Defendant testified in direct
14

examination that before he acted he looked up the law on "on-line" to make sure that the
requirements were the same. (Transcript November 15th, 2001, pages 38 & 39). Defendant testified
that it was a common practice for him to arrest people who violated their bonds and take them to jail,
but that it had been a while so he wanted to make sure of what the law was. Id. He looked in the
Utah Code under § 77-20-8.5 (1998). He testified that he believed he could legally do what he did.
Id
Defendant also testified that he talked to Tony Baird at the Cache County Attorney's Office
and to other law enforcement officers. He was not allowed to testify as to hearsay matters, but did
testify about contacting those individuals. (See Transcript November 15th, pages 40 & 41). In
addition to defendant testifying about those things on direct examination, his co-defendant Mr.
Lloyd testified in direct examination, that he asked defendant about the legality of the arrest and
Norton showed him the law and what it said and that nothing they read together prohibited them from
doing what they did. (See Transcript November 15th, page 114). Lloyd also testified that defendant
had talked to his Attorney, and to his brother, whom defendant testified was a police officer in
another state. Mr. Lloyd testified that their state of mind when they committed these acts was that
"everything was completely legitimate and there would be no issues." (See Transcript November
15th, page 114, line 16). Through Lloyd the jury heard that the co-defendants did not know that thenconduct would violate the law and that they had made efforts to find out what the law was. Mr.
Galloway, the defense attorney, in his opening statement stated:
As I said, it's a strange case, you're going to hear about two individuals that did everything in
their power, bent over backwards to stay within the law, they had the help of State officials,
they had the help of policemen, they conferred with individuals, they did everything in their
power to do what they could do to stay within the law. We believe they did stay within the
law, and believe that you will find that at the end of this trial. (Transcript November 14th,
page 60).
15

In his closing argument, Mr. Galloway also talks about the effort that Mr. Norton has gone to
to make sure he is acting legally. He states that Mr. Norton talked police officers about what he
should do; he talks to the "County Attorneys"; he looks through what he thinks is the proper
paperwork; he went out with his brother who is a police officer, believing that he had authority to
revoke the bond; that the co-defendants thought everything was legit, and that they looked at the laws
over the internet. (Transcript November 15th, pages 205-206).
The only objection placed on the record about not allowing Mr. Norton to retake the stand,
was that Mr. Norton wanted to testiiy about the way that the code was written. (Transcript November
15th, page 155). Defendant has not preserved any other argument for appeal. The record clearly
shows that defendant did present evidence about his efforts to determine the law. Defendant claims
that the trial court prohibited him from presenting evidence about his state of mind, that he
(allegedly) did not know that his conduct was violating the law. That is likewise not true. Defendant
testified about the efforts that he went through, the people he talked to. His attorney told the jury that
defendant talked to many people, looked at the law, and believed he had authority to do what he did.
His co-defendant testified that they looked at the law and believed that everything was authorized.
The jury heard all of this evidence and simply did not believe defendant's version of the facts.
A. Even if this court believes that the trial court erred in not allowing Mr. Norton to
retake the witness stand, that alleged error was harmless.
Defendant claims that he should have been allowed to testify as to the things that the codefendant testified to. The State believes that defendant was given that opportunity. However, if this
Court does not reach that conclusion, and believes that the trial court's ruling prohibiting Mr. Norton
from re-testifying was in error, such alleged error was harmless. As to the second date, April 16th,
2000, defendant and his co-defendant Mr. Lloyd were charged with the same conduct and the same
16

offenses. Defendant claims that he should have been allowed to testify as Mr. Lloyd did. Mr. Lloyd
testified that he had asked defendant about the legality of the arrest and Norton showed him the law
and what it said and that nothing they read together prohibited them from doing what they did. (See
Transcript November 15th, page 114). Lloyd also testified that defendant had talked to his Attorney,
and to his brother, whom defendant testified was a police officer in another state. Mr. Lloyd testified
that their state of mind when they committed these acts was that "everything was completely
legitimate and there would be no issues." (See Transcript November 15th, page 114, line 16).
Even though the jury heard about all of these efforts that Mr. Lloyd had allegedly taken, along
with Mr. Norton, they still convicted Lloyd as charged of all of the charges. It would not have made a
difference with this jury had Mr. Norton testified to the same thing as Mr. Lloyd. He still would have
been found guilty as charged by this jury. In the case of Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc. v. White. 40
P.3d 1155,1159 (Utah App. 2002), the Utah Court of Appeals held that:
[Ejven where error is found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of
all of the evidence presented at trial, it appears that "absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood that a different result would have been reached."...Moreover the person asserting
error has the burden to show not only that the error occurred but also that it was substantial
and prejudicial." Id.
Even if this court believes that there was an error in this case, there is no reasonable likelihood
that the result would have been different, where Lloyd was convicted as charged. Defendant has
failed in his burden to show that the alleged error was substantial and prejudicial. Defendant has no
evidence of that and any argument would be wholly speculative.
B.

Even if this Court believes that defendant is entitled to a new trial on the Bail
Bond Recovery charges, there is independent evidence sufficient to sustain the
unlawful detention and assault conviction from April 16th, 2000.

Even if this court decides that Mr. Norton is entitled to a new trial on the Bail Bond Recovery
charges, there is independent evidence to support defendant's other convictions for the date of April
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16,2000. Judge Wilmore had released the victim after he was arrested the first time. Defendant, by
going back and arresting him without even checking into the reason for his release, was at least
reckless as to whether he was committing unlawful detention.
As to the assault, there is independent evidence sufficient to support that charge even if this
Court believes that defendant is entitled to a new trial on all of the charges. The victim testified that
when he was being arrested by defendant, first he was pepper sprayed, he was then tackled and hit
with a rock, he was later punched and had a gun stuck to his chest. The victim testified that defendant
told him that he was going to take him up the canyon and kill him. (Transcript November 14th, pages
77-84 & 108-112). These actions went above and beyond any action necessary to properly effect the
victim's arrest, and turned those actions into assault, for which defendant was properly convicted.
This court should look at the convictions of unlawful detention and assault from April 16th, 2000, in
the light most favorable to the jury verdict. In the case of State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah
1994), the Utah Supreme Court held that when reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence,
"we reemphasize the limited role of the appellate court. In such cases, we afford great deference to
the jury verdict." Quoting State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 1991). The Court further held
that "[w]e will not sit as a second fact finder, nor will we determine the credibility of the witnesses.
That is the prerogative of the jury. 'Where there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a
reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict'". Goddard at 543, quoting
State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273,285 (Utah 1989), cert denied. 494 U.S. 1090,110 S.Ct. 1837,108
L.Ed.2d 965 (1990). The jury viewed the demeanor of the witnesses and chose to believe the victim
about the facts of this case. Even if this Court believes that defendant is entitled to a new trial on the

18

Bail Bond Recover}' charges, this Court should sustain the jury's verdicts on the assault
detention convictions,
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Because this case presents no complex or novel question, and because the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, the State requests neither oral argument
nor a published opinion in this case.
DATED T H I S ^ A day of October, 2002

^ - f r w j 6te<t^)f,
DEAN SAUNDERS
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR DELIVERY
I In is to certify that a true and correct copy ot the toregoing was hand delivered, to
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\ llorney for Defendant
Law Office of Barton J. Warren
261 East 300 South, Suite 175
Salt Lake City, Utah 841II

DATED this [[_ day of October, 2002.
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53-9-119
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CRIMINAL INVESTIG/

18) All fines collected under this section shall be deposited in the General
Fund

Section
53-10-204

H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 53-9-118, e n a c t e d h\ L.
1995, c h . 314, § 2 1 ; 1998, c h . 212, § 3 5; 1998,
c h . 282, * 4 1 .
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 amendm e n t by ch. 212, effective May 4, 1998, rewrote
the section.

53-10-200

53-9-119

The 1998 amendment by ch. 282, effective
May 4, 1998, substituted "peace officer" for uIaw
enforcement officer" in Subsection (l)(d).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel

53-10-2()ei
53-10-201

Violation « Penalty.

53-10-20h

Any person who violates am provision of this chapter is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 53-9-119, e n a c t e d by L.
1995, c h . 314, § 22; 1998, c h . 212, * 16.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — Th* 1998 amend-

53-9-120.

ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted u any
person" for "a licensee, registrant, or employee"
.it the beginning
53-10-208 1.

!u pealed.

53-10-209
R e p e a l s . — Laws 1998, ch. 212, Jj 17 repeals
§ 53-9-120, as enacted by L. 1995, ch 314, § 23,

concerning the grandfather provision of those
persons validly licensed, effective May 4, 1998.

CHAPTER 10
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND
TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION

,33-10-210
53-10-211.

53-10-212
•iilllillillHII,

C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — Laws 1998, chs 257. 282 and 343 also enacted a Chapter 10 of thr title,
those chapters have been renumbered as Chapters 11, 13 and 12, respectively
Part 1
IJMIIM i'dl P n n i s i o n s

Section
53-10-101.
53-10-102.
53-10-103.

53-10-104.
53-10-105.

53-10-106
53-10-107

53 10 I Oh

•3-10-109.

Short title.
Definitions.
Division — Creation — Director appointment and qualifications.
Division duties.
Assistance to law enforcement
agencies — Investigation of
crimes — Laboratory facilities.
Cooperation with agencies of
any state or nation.
Admissibility in evidence of
certified copies of division
files
Restrictions on access, use,
and contents of division
records — Limited use of
records for employment purposes — Challenging accuracy of records — Usage fees
— Missing children records
Telecommunications systems.

Section
53-10-110.

53-10-111.
53 10-112
53-10-11,1
53-10-11 I

B u r e a u of C r i m i n a l I d e n t i f i c a t i o n

53-10-201'
53-10-202 f>
53-10-20'!

Part 3

I

Criminal Investigations Burea
53-10-30]

Authority ol officers and officials to take
fingerprints,
photographs,
and
other
data
Refusal to provide information
— False information — Misdemeanor.
Director and officers to have
peace officer powers
agencies to cooperate
li division.
>rity regarding drug precuisors.
Part 2

53-10-201

h||

Bureau of Criminal Identification — Creation — Bureau
Chief appointment, qualifications, and compensation.
i Yiminal identification — Duties of bureau
Bureau services — Fees.
Missing persons — Reports —
Notification.

Missing person recon
Confidentiality — Ava
ityUniform crime reportin
tern — Use of data.
Collection of informatioi
Peace officers, prosec
and magistrates to s
information to state
F.B.I. — Notification
rest based on warrant
Definition — Offense
eluded on statewide
rant system — Trans
tion fee to be includ
Statewide w a r r a n t s
responsibility — Q
control — Training —
nical support — Trans
costs.
Magistrates and court
to supply information
Penal institutions and
hospital to supply in
tion.
Response for requests —
Notice required of a n
school employee fo
trolled substance or
fense.
Supplies and equipmt
compliance h\
re
agencies.

Criminal I n v e s t i g a t e
reau — Creation —

GENEI
I'ili-KI 1IHIL

Whurt i i l h ,

This chapU'i r- I n<m n i
Services Act."
Lli si in-) ! . 1953, 53-5-101, e n a c t "
1093, c h 234. & 178; r e n u m b e r e d
1998, c h . 263, § 7.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998
ment renumbered this section, which

i>;i-IO-l02

Hi b u l l i o n s ,

A s u s e d i n 1 hi i L q i l u
1 i \ I ni mi i ni ni ni ni 11 i tio11 ml i i
i i l i u ' iiLtor L L t L i t i o n , a p p n

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND TECHNICAL SERVICES
Section
53-10-204.
53-10-205.
53-10-206.
53-10-207.

53-10-208.

53-10-208.1.
53-10-209.
53-10-210.
53-10-211.

53-10-212.

Section
Missing person records —
Confidentiality — Availability.
Uniform crime reporting system — Use of data.
Collection of information.
Peace officers, prosecutors,
and magistrates to supply
information to state and
F.B.I. — Notification of arrest based on warrant.
Definition — Offenses included on statewide warrant system — Transportation fee to be included —
Statewide warrant system
responsibility — Quality
control — Training — Technical support — Transaction
costs.
Magistrates and court clerks
to supply information.
Penal institutions and state
hospital to supply information.
Response for requests — Fees.
Notice required of arrest of
school employee for controlled substance or sex offense.
Supplies and equipment for
compliance by reporting
agencies.
Part 3

53-10-302.
53-10-303.

53-10-304.
53-10-305.

Bureau of Forensic Services
53-10-401.

53-10-402.
53-10-403.
53-10-404.
53-10-405.
53-10-406.

Bureau of Forensic Services —
Creation — Bureau Chief
appointment, qualifications,
and compensation.
Bureau duties.
Blood analysis — Application
to offenders.
Blood analysis — Requirement to obtain sample.
Blood analysis — Sample to be
drawn by professional.
Blood analysis — Bureau responsibilities.
Part 5

Bureau of Communications
53-10-501.

Criminal Investigations Bureau — Creation — Bureau

Chief appointment, qualifications, and compensation.
Bureau duties.
Financial Fraud and Money
Laundering Forfeiture Account created — Revenue
sources — Use of account
designated.
Narcotics and alcoholic beverage enforcement — Responsibility and jurisdiction.
Duties of bureau chief.
Part 4

Criminal Investigations Bureau
53-10-301.

53-10-102

53-10-502.

Bureau of Communications —
Creation — Bureau Chief
appointment, qualifications,
and compensation.
Bureau duties.

PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
53-10-101. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Criminal Investigations and Technical
Services Act."
^History
iistory: C. 1953, 53-5-101, enacted by L.
993, ch. 234, § 178; renumbered by L.
998, ch. 263, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-

3-10-102.

appeared as § 53-5-101, and substituted
"Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Act" for "Law Enforcement and Technical
Services Act."

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Administration of criminal justice" means performance of any of the
following: detection, apprehension, detention, pretrial release, posttrial

77-20-8

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS
,
,
Liability of bondsman.
Termination of bonding authority.
—Notice and hearing.
Writ of prohibition.
Liability of bondsman.
Bondsman is liable only for "all appearances
required of the defendant." He is not liable for
payment of the defendant's fine, nor is he liable
for the defendant's fidelity to the terms of his
probation. Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1987).
The statutory phrase "up to and including
surrender of the defendant in execution of any
sentence imposed" clearly indicates an intent to
extend liability beyond the imposition of sentence. It contemplates the defendant's appearing and surrendering himself to serve his sen-

tence. Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1987).
Termination of bonding authority.
- N o t i c e and hearing.
Circuit court abused its discretion in not
providing notice and hearing prior to termination of respondents' bonding authority,
Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739 P.2d 1108
(Utah 1987).
Writ of prohibition.
Suspension without notice of bail bondsmen's
authority to post bail in circuit court during
pendency in district court of petition challenging lawfulness of certain forfeitures was improper. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d
956 (Utah 1987).

77-20-8. Grounds for detaining or releasing defendant on
conviction and prior to sentence.
(1) Upon conviction, by plea or trial, the court shall order that the convicted
defendant who is waiting imposition or execution of sentence be detained,
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence presented by the
defendant that the defendant is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court,
and will not pose a danger to the physical, psychological, or financial and
economic safety or well-being of any other person or the community if released.
(2) If the court finds the defendant does not need to be detained, the court
shall order the release of the defendant on suitable conditions, which may
include the conditions under Subsection 77-20-10(2).
History: C. 1953, 77-20-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1988, ch. 160, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Statutory Enactments —

Criminal Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 349.
C.J.S. — 8 C.J.S. Bail § 43.

77-20-8.5. Sureties — Surrender of defendant — Arrest of
defendant.
(1) (a) The sureties may at any time prior to a forfeiture of their bail
surrender the defendant and obtain exoneration of their bail by filing
written requests at the time of the surrender.
(b) To effect surrender, certified duplicate copies of the undertaking
shall be delivered to a peace officer, who shall detain the defendant in his
custody as upon a commitment, and shall in writing acknowledge the
surrender upon one copy of the undertaking. This certified copy of the
undertaking upon which the acknowledgment of surrender is endorsed
shall be filed with the court. The court may then, upon proper application,
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order the undertaking exonerated and may order a refund of any paid
premium, or part of a premium, as it finds just.
(2) For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the sureties may arrest
him at any time before they are finally exonerated and at any place within the
state.
* (3) A surety acting under this section is subject to the provisions of Title 53,
Chapter 10, Bail Bond Recovery.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-8.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 160, § 3; 1998, ch. 257, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection
iB).
Compiler's Notes. — Title 53, Chapter 10,

Bail Bond Recovery, cited in Subsection (3), was
renumbered as Chapter 11 by the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel because of the enactment at the same session of
another Chapter 10

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Extent of rights of sureties
Cited
Extent of rights of sureties.
If sureties do not avail themselves of the
rights given to them, they will be estopped in
an action on the undertaking from denying that
the principal was liable to arrest upon the
charge, to answer which the undertaking sued
on was given United States v Eldredge, 5 Utah
189,14 P 42 (1887), appeal dismissed, 145 U S
636, 12 S Ct 980, 36 L Ed 857 (1892)
As a general rule an arrest and surrender of
the principal, to be effectual as an exoneration
of the surety, must have been made before

liability of the surety under the bond or recognizance had by forfeiture or judgment become
fixed, and could not be done as of right after the
forfeiture or judgment had been paid or the
surety otherwise discharged Dickson v
Mullings, 66 Utah 282, 241 P 840, 43 A L R
136 (1925)
Surety on bail bond forfeited for nonappearance of principal to answer charge of felonious
assault could not, two years after payment of
judgment and discharge of surety, have principal arrested, without legal process, by police in
another jurisdiction Dickson v Mullmgs, 66
Utah 282, 241 P 840, 43 A.L R 136 (1925)
Cited in Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc v Fifth
Dist Court, 933 P2d 1011 (Utah Ct App 1997)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Statutory Enactments —
Criminal Law, 1989 Utah L Rev 349

77-20-9. Disposition of forfeitures.
If by reason of the neglect of the defendant to appear, money deposited
instead of bail or money paid by sureties on surety bond is forfeited and the
forfeiture is not discharged or remitted, the clerk with whom it is deposited or
paid shall, immediately after final adjournment of the court, pay over the
money forfeited as follows:
(1) the forfeited bail cases in or appealed from district courts shall be
distributed as provided in Section 78-3-14.5;
(2) the forfeited bail in cases in precinct justice courts or m municipal
justice courts shall be distributed as provided m Sections 78-5-116 and
78-5-135;
(3) the forfeited bail in cases in justice courts where the offense is not
triable in that court shall be paid into the General Fund; and
(4) the forfeited bail in cases not provided for in this section shall be
paid 50% to the state treasurer and the remainmg 50% to the county
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<2) provides facilities and acts as a public safety answering point to
answer and respond to 911 calls from a region;
(3) provides professional emergency dispatch and communications support for law enforcement, emergency medical, fire suppression, highway
maintenance, jmblic works, and public safety agencies representing municipal, county, state, and federal governments; and
<4) coordinates incident response.
History: C. 1953,53-10-502, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 263, § 44; 1999, ch. 21, § 48.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend•Hieat, effective May 3, 1999, substituted "911"

for "9-1-1* in Subsection (2).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 263
became effective on May 4, 1998, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 11
BAIL BOND RECOVERY
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was enacted as Chapter 10 of this title, it was renumbered,
with section references changed accordmgiy, by the Office of Legislative Research and General
J wit
Counsel because of the enactment of another chapter with the same number.
Section
53-11-10L
53-11-102.
53-11-103.
53-11-104.
53-11-105.
53-11-106.
53-11-107.
53-11-108.
53-11-109.
53-11-110.
53-11-111.
53-11-112.
53-11-113.

Title.
Definitions.
Commissioner of Public Safety
administers — Licensure —
Rulemaking.
Board.
Powers and duties of board.
Board meetings and hearings
— Quorum.
Licenses — Classifications —
Prohibited acts.
Licensure — Basic qualifications.
Licensure ~ Bail enforcement
agent.
Bail enforcement agent as
agency — Bond — Workers'
compensation.
Licensure — Bail recovery
agent — Requirements and
limitations
Licensure — Bail recovery apprentices — Requirements
and limitations
Bail recovery agent and bail
recovery apprentice licensure — Liability insurance
— Fee — Workers' compensation.

Section
53-11-114.
53-11-115.
53-11-116.

53-11-116.5.
53-11-117.
53-11-118.
53-11-119

^

Licensure — Qualification
credit for specified training
License fees — Deposit m
General Fund
Issuance of license and card to
applicant — License period
— Expiration of application
— Transfer of license prohibited.
Identification cards
Workers' compensation requirements for employees'
licensure.
Grounds for denial of license
— Appeal.
Grounds for disciplinary ac-

tion.
53-11-120.
53-11-121.
53-11-122.
53-11-123.
53-11-124.

Requirement to identify employing agency.
False representation as a licensee
Requirements during search
and seizure — Notification
of law enforcement agency
Notification of local law enforcement.
Penalties.

53-11-101. Title,
Tliis cnapter is known as the "bmlBorl^iecover^Act. , '
History: C. 1953,53-10-101, enacted by L.
998, ch. 257, § 1; recompiled as 53-11-101.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 257

became effective on May 4, 1998, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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of cocaine. State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 R2d 1356
(Utah 1993).
There was no nexus between parties' personal relationship and defendant's actions in
approaching undercover officer and inquiring
whether she could help him procure a pound of
marijuana. State v. Keitz, 856 R2d 685 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).

The mere existence of a personal relationship
does not establish entrapment. Entrapment
requires some exploitation of the personal relationship. State v. Martinez, 848 R2d 702 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 R2d 585 (Utah
1993).
Although the state, through an undercover
officer, exploited a close personal relationship
with defendant, there was no nexus between
the personal relationship and defendant's offer

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — If the
Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who is the
Next Target? — An Examination of the Entrapment Theory, 19 J. Contemp. L. 217 (1993).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 244 et seq.
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 58.
A.L.R. — Larceny: entrapment or consent,
10 A.L.R.3d 1121.
False arrest or imprisonment: entrapment as
precluding justification of arrest or imprisonment, 15 A.L.R.3d 963.
Defense of entrapment in contempt proceedings, 41 A.L.R.3d 418.
Admissibility of evidence of other offenses in
rebuttal of defense of entrapment, 61 A.L.R.3d
293.

Entrapment as a defense in proceedings to
revoke or suspend license to practice law or
medicine, 61 A.L.R.3d 357.
Modern status of the law concerning entrapment to commit narcotics offense — state cases,
62 A.L.R.3d 110.
Burden of proof as to entrapment defense —
state cases, 52 A.L.R.4th 775.
Entrapment as defense to charge of selling or
supplying narcotics where government agents
supplied narcotics to defendant and purchased
them from him, 9 A.L.R.5th 464.
Right of criminal defendant to raise entrapment defense based on having dealt with other
party who was entrapped, 15 A.L.R,5th 39.
Actions by state official involving defendant
as constituting "outrageous" conduct violating
due process guaranties, 18 A.L.R.5th 1.

76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law
is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his
conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable
reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he
believed.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-304, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-304; 1974, ch. 32, § 5.
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